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ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES UNDER BILY V.
ARTHUR YOUNG & COMPANY: DOES A WATCHDOG
NEED PROTECTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
Today's accounting profession performs a large part of its services
in the capacity of an independent auditor.1 The independent auditing
of both public and private businesses plays a critical role in the eco-
nomic community.2 As an auditor, the accountant assumes professional
responsibilities not only to his or her client, but also to third parties who
rely on the auditor's statements when making financial decisions. 3
1. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 749 (Cal. 1992) (recogniz-
ing that certified public accountants' primary service is financial auditing); Willis
W. Hagen II, Certified Public Accountants' Liability for Malpractice: Effect of Compliance
with GAAP and GAAS, 13J. CONTEMP. L. 65, 66 (1987) (stating that certified pub-
lic accountant's principal function is independent auditing); Samuel S. Paschall,
Liability to Non-Clients: The Accountant's Role and Responsibility, 53 Mo. L. REV. 693,
698 (1988) (asserting that majority of accountants' revenues come from audit-
ing). The word auditor means "one who hears." HOWARD F. STErrLER, AUDIT-
ING PRINCIPLES 5 (4th ed. 1977). The term comes from the time when public
accounts were read aloud for approval and acceptance. Id. The persons hearing
the accounts and approving them were known as auditors. Id. The function of
an independent audit is to verify "the financial statements of an entity through
an examination of the underlying accounting records and supporting evidence."
Bily, 834 P.2d at 749 (quoting Hagen, supra, at 66).
2. John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Re-
form, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1932 (1988). On a microeconomic level, independ-
ent auditing helps insure that individual companies are running at optimum
levels by disclosing to internal management any weaknesses in their internal ac-
counting systems. Id. Aggregately, these individual checks help insure the
health of the larger financial community. Therefore, on a macroeconomic level,
independent audits of individual companies provide potential investors and
creditors with reliable information that is needed for determining financial risks
and optimizing capital expenditures. Id.
3. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
The Supreme Court, in denying work-product immunity for accountants' tax ac-
crual workpapers, stated that:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's
financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility
transcending any employment relationship with the client. The in-
dependent public accountant performing this special function owes ul-
timate allegiance to the corporations's creditors and stockholders, as
well as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" function de-
mands that the accountant maintain total independence from the client
at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust. To insu-
late from disclosure a certified public accountant's interpretations of
the client's financial statements would be to ignore the significance of
the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public
obligations.
Id.; see also In re Touche, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957). The Touche court held that
(249)
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These responsibilities create a unique relationship between the auditor,
the client and interested third parties.4 In light of these responsibilities
and relationships, there exists a significant debate in both the court-
rooms and academia concerning the legal duty of care, under a negli-
gence action, that an auditor must exercise toward third parties who rely
on the auditor's statements. 5
an auditor's responsibility is not only to the paying client but also to the credi-
tors and investors who rely on the auditor's certification of the client's financial
statements. Id.; see generally AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS ET § 53.01 (CCH
1988). The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), com-
menting on accountants' responsibility, stated that:
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance of its responsibility
to the public. The accounting profession's public consists of clients,
credit grantors, governments, employers, investors, the business and
financial community, and others who rely on the objectivity and integ-
rity of certified public accountant's to maintain the orderly functioning
of commerce. This reliance imposes a public interest responsibility on
certified public accountants.
Id.
4. Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 150 (N.J. 1983). In Rosenblum, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey explained:
Whenever [the auditor] certifies a financial statement [he or she] is po-
tentially, at least, rendering a service to two or more parties whose in-
terests may come into conflict-management and stockholder,
borrower and lender, purchaser and seller. He may, and often does,
serve simultaneously competitors in the same line of business, without
fear on the part of either client that he will favor one or the other. It is
this peculiar obligation of the certified public accountant, which no
other profession has to impose on its members, to maintain a wholly
objective and impartial attitude toward the affairs of the client whose
financial statement he certifies.
Id. (quoting J. CAREY, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING 13-14
(1946)); see also Bily, 834 P.2d at 751. The Bily court stated that favorable auditor
opinions allow businesses to procure capital from lenders and investors. Id.
Under these circumstances, clients have a "biased interest" in obtaining a
favorable opinion. Id. Investors and creditors, on the other hand, require accu-
rate and credible reports to make effective and efficient decisions for resource
allocation. Id.; see also STETrLER, supra note 1, at 7-8. Stettler explains that
although the auditor's opinion is typically addressed to the client, the opinion
will be used by persons other than the client. Id. This fact embodies the unique
relationship between client and auditor. Id. at 8. Although the auditor is com-
pensated by the client, total independence must be sustained in all areas relating
to the audit. Id. Such independence is necessary for the achievement of "wide-
spread acceptance" of the auditors opinion. Id. For the purposes of this Note,
interested third parties include investors, creditors, or any other entity or indi-
vidual interacting with the client for financial purposes.
5. See, e.g., Paschall, supra note 1, at 719-28 (asserting that auditors should
have duty to all reasonably foreseeable third parties); Howard B. Wiener, Com-
mon Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 259-60 (1983) (supporting expansion of auditors liabil-
ity to all foreseeable injury in order to compensate injured parties, deter negli-
gent conduct and apply standard of negligence liability, applicable in all other
contexts). But see Thomas L. Gossman, IMC v. Butler. A Case for Expanded Profes-
sional Liability for Negligent Misrepresentation?, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 101, 126-27 (1988)
(asserting that adoption of foreseeability approach in determining accountant's
250
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The California Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Bily
v. Arthur Young & Company.6 In Bily, the court held that, in claims of
professional negligence, an accountant's general duty of care regarding
an audit extends only to the client. 7 The court held that an auditor may
be liable under the claim of negligent misrepresentation, however, to
third parties who were the intended beneficiaries of the auditor's state-
ments and who were actually foreseen. 8 The California Supreme
Court's decision limits the scope of an auditor's liability, 9 which had
been significantly expanded in California only several years earlier.' 0
This holding may be the beginning of a significant trend that could have
a great impact on the economic community in California and other juris-
dictions that have not resolved this issue.' I
This Note first discusses the development of independent auditing
liability is "unwarranted and unwise" because it is legally unsound and ill-ad-
vised for public policy reasons); Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1931 (supporting priv-
ity restrictions on auditor's liability to third parties for public policy reasons); see
also Mark D. Boveri & Brent E. Marshall, Note, The Enlarging Scope of Auditors'
Liability To Relying Third Parties, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 281 (1983) (discussing
privity approach to auditor's liability and emerging foreseeability approach).
For a discussion of the different standards that courts use in defining an audi-
tor's liability to third parties, see infra notes 22-89 and accompanying text.
6. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
7. Id. at 747. This limitation of liability is referred to as the privity stan-
dard. For a further discussion of the privity standard and how it is applied in
accountant liability cases, see infra notes 30-61 and accompanying text.
8. Bily, 834 P.2d at 747. This limitation of liability is referred to as the Re-
statement approach. For a further discussion of the Restatement approach and how
it is applied in accountant liability cases, see infra notes 62-72 and accompanying
text. The Bily dissent found the application of different standards to the two
negligence claims illogical. Bily, 834 P.2d at 776 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The
dissent asserted that courts should apply the same standard of care under both
theories of liability. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). It argued that the scope of an
auditor's duty should not depend on "which legal theory had been pleaded." Id.
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
9. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 775 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard be-
lieves that the majority's decision will give negligent auditors extensive immu-
nity for negligent preparations of audit opinions. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
For a further discussion of the dissenting opinion, see infra notes 146-69 and
accompanying text.
10. See Int'l Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal.
Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (expanding auditor's liability to those reasonably
foreseeable third parties who had relied on auditor's report). For a further dis-
cussion of International Mortgage and the history of accountant liability law in Cal-
ifornia prior to Bily, see infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
11. See Richard B. Schmitt, California Court Limits Liability of Auditors, WALL
ST.J., Aug. 28, 1992, at BI. In reporting on the Bily case, the Wall Street Journal
(Journal) concluded that the holding will affect the ability of capital investors,
creditors and the government to recover financial damages for relying on negli-
gently audited financial statements. Id. Moreover, the Journal stated that "[t]he
decision ... present[s] a new and difficult hurdle for potential plaintiffs in what
has been one of the nation's most hostile jurisdictions for auditors." Id. For a
further discussion on the impact of the Bily decision on California and other
jurisdictions, see infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
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and its impact on the accounting profession and the economic commu-
nity. The Note then addresses an accountant's legal duty under the tort
of negligent misrepresentation and the three basic liability standards
adopted by most jurisdictions, including the standard utilized in Califor-
nia courts prior to the Bily decision. The Note next examines the analy-
sis employed by the California Supreme Court in Bily and critically
analyzes the court's rationale. The Note proposes a more equitable ap-
proach in determining auditors' liability. This approach would allow re-
covery for valid third party claims while still maintaining the economic
viability of the accounting profession. The Note concludes by examin-
ing the impact Bily may have on California and other states.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of Auditing
Until the early 19 3 0s, corporations primarily used independent au-
dits to check their internal accounting procedures for efficiency and in-
tegrity. 12 Demand for independent auditing grew, however, with the
increasing need for companies to seek capital from outside parties and
the Securities and Exchange Commission's commitment to providing ac-
curate information to investors.iS Today, most accounting firms receive
12. See Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (NJ. 1983) (noting that "at
one time the audit was made primarily to inform management of irregularities
and inefficiencies in the business."); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,
446 (N.Y. 1931). In Ultramares, Justice Cardozo stated that independent audits
were "a convenient instrumentality for use in the development of the business,
and only incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom [the company]
might exhibit it [there]after." Id.; see also Albert G. Besser, Privity ?- An Obsolete
Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 507,
531 (1976) (stating that primary use of auditing in early 20th century was for
apprising client's management of inconsistencies and fraudulent activities); Wie-
ner, supra note 5, at 250 (stating that "the primary responsibility of an auditor
was to the owner of a business to report on the operation of that business and to
detect fraud and embezzlement by the company's employees.").
13. See Paschall, supra note 1, at 722 (noting that federal securities regula-
tions in 19 30s and maturation of large enterprises seeking external capital
greatly increased demand for independent audits); Wiener, supra note 5, at 250
(asserting that statutes administered by Securities and Exchange Commission
reflect belief that dependable financial information is essential prerequisite for
informed investment decisions). The Securities and Exchange Commission,
through the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
took substantial steps in providing investors with credible and unbiased disclo-
sure of public companies. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 149; Paschall, supra note 1, at
722; see also WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 257 (6th
ed. 1988) (stating that Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of
1934 "were designed to facilitate informed investment analysis and decisions by
the investing public, primarily by ensuring adequate disclosure of material infor-
mation"). The Securities Act of 1933 requires certified financial statements for
all prospectuses filed in connection with public offerings of stock. Rosenblum,
461 A.2d at 149 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7 7 g & 77aa (1981)). The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 requires companies that have assets of one million dollars or
4
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the majority of their revenues from auditing, 14 and corporations primar-
ily use independent audits to establish their financial credibility to lend-
ers and investors. 15 Unfortunately, the demand for auditing has not
only expanded an accounting firm's revenues, but has also increased
their exposure to liability.1 6 This exposure results when third parties
rely on the representations of a company's certified financial statements.
B. Auditors' Duty To Third Parties
If a third party is injured by relying on false representations negli-
gently prepared by an independent auditor, he may bring a claim under
professional negligence (malpractice), or negligent misrepresentation.'
7
Although the Bily court clearly distinguishes between the two torts, most
courts and commentators find no practical difference between the torts
when applied to false representations.Is Consequently, most courts fail
to distinguish between the torts when addressing auditor liability 19 or
focus their analysis solely on the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
20
more and over 500 shareholders to include certified financial statements in their
annual reports. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(l)(g)(1) (1981)).
14. For a discussion of the significance of independent auditing to account-
ing firm revenues, see supra note I and accompanying text.
15. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 751 (Cal. 1992). The Bily
court explained:
[A]udit reports are very frequently (if not almost universally) used by
businesses to establish the financial credibility of their enterprises in
the perceptions of outside persons, e.g., existing and prospective inves-
tors, financial institutions, and others who extend credit to an enter-
prise or make risk-oriented decisions based on its economic viability.
Id.; see also Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 149 (stating that audit opinions are created for
use of investors and creditors "who have no contractual relationship with the
auditor"); JOHN D. BAZLEY ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: CONCErTS AND USES
35 (1988) (noting that numerous financial transactions by investors and credi-
tors are based on reliance of information found in financial statements); Pas-
chall, supra note 1, at 723 (stating that primary users of audit opinions are third
parties that auditor's client is attempting to attract); Wiener, supra note 5, at 250
(stating that independent auditing of public companies is primarily for benefit of
third parties).
16. See Stephen M. Lazare, Note, H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: A Foreseeabil-
ity Unreasonable Extension of an Auditor's Legal Duty, 48 ALBANY L. REV. 876, 902-04
(1984) (asserting that increased uses for accountants' work increases account-
ants' liability exposure).
17. Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1933 & n.19.
18. Id. (citing Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1563 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988). For a discussion of the Bily court's liability
analysis under each tort, see infra notes 116-45 and accompanying text.
19. See Bily, 786 P.2d at 768. The Bily court stated that "neither the courts,
the commentators, nor the authors of the Restatement Second of Torts have
made clear or careful distinctions between the [two torts]." Id.
20. Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 142 (NJ. 1983). The Rosenblum
court stated that an action against an auditor is "realistically one predicated
upon his representations." Id. Therefore, the court concluded, claims of pro-
fessional malpractice "can be viewed as grounded in negligent misrepresenta-
tion." Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines negligent misrepresentation:
5
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Typically, the majority of third party claims against independent audi-
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, sup-
plies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise rea-
sonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 105-110 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.
1988). In order to recover under negligent misrepresentation, a third party
plaintiff must prove that: 1) the auditor owed the party a legal duty of care; 2)
the auditor breached that duty; 3) the party justifiably relied on the representa-
tions of the auditor; 4) the party suffered injury; and 5) the auditor's misrepre-
sentations were the cause in fact and proximate cause of the party's injury.
Paschall, supra note 1, at 704. For a detailed discussion of these elements in the
context of auditor liability cases, see IRVING KELLOGG, HOW TO FIND NEGLIGENCE
AND MISREPRESENTATIONS IN FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 214-20 (3d ed. 1983). Many
courts adopting the tort of negligent misrepresentation have used some varia-
tion of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977). For a discussion of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 552 and its application in this area, see infra notes 62-
72 and accompanying text. For a list of jurisdictions adopting the Restatement
approach, see infra note 28.
A defendant auditor may effectively challenge a negligent misrepresentation
claim by showing that the auditor exercised the reasonable care that a compe-
tent member of his or her profession would have used in the same or similar
circumstances. Samuel S. Paschall, Professional Negligence: The Accountant's Liabil-
ity to Third Parties, TRIAL, July 1989, 61-64. One resource a juror or judge can
use in measuring an auditor's standard of care is the Comprehensive GAAS
Guide (GAAS Guide). Bily, 834 P.2d at 750 (citing MARTIN A. MILLER & LARRY
P. BAILEY, COMPREHENSIVE GAAS GuIDE (1991)). The GAAS Guide is a fre-
quently used summary of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) Id.
The generally accepted auditing standards, in abbreviated form, are as follows:
General Standards
1. The audit is to be performed by a person or persons having ade-
quate technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in
mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the
audit and the preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
1. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to
be properly supervised.
2. A sufficient understanding of the internal control structure is to be
obtained to plan the audit and to determine the nature, timing, and
extent of tests to be performed.
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through
inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reason-
able basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under
audit.
Standards of Reporting
1. The report shall state whether the financial statements are
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
2. The report shall identify those circumstances in which principles
have not been consistently observed in the current period in relation to
the preceding period.
6
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Under either tort, the scope of an auditor's legal duty of care to
persons outside the auditor-client relationship creates the principle area
of dispute with respect to auditor negligence claims. 22 The scope of an
auditor's liability toward third parties is a policy issue that every jurisdic-
tion must confront.2 3 Currently, there are three judicially recognized
standards for determining an auditor's duty of care to third parties.
2 4
Several jurisdictions follow Justice Cardozo's holding in Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche, 25 which limits an auditor's liability to those persons with
whom the auditor was in privity or a relationship "akin to privity."
'26
3. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be re-
garded as reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
4. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding
the financial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect
that an opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall opinion cannot
be expressed, the reasons therefore should be stated. In all cases
where an auditor's name is associated with financial statements, the re-
port should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the audi-
tor's work, if any, and the degree of responsibility the auditor is taking.
AICPA AUDITING STANDARDS: ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS no. 1, § 150.02 (Wil-
liam R. Lalli ed., 1990). The adherence to generally accepted auditing princi-
ples or standards may provide evidence of due care, but it is not conclusive.
Paschall, supra note 1, at 705 (citing United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970)). In Simon, the court held that the
practice of generally accepted accounting principles will not always shield an
auditor from liability, particularly where the auditor knowingly chooses not to
disclose material facts. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 808. For a com-
prehensive discussion of an auditor's standard of care in negligent misrepresen-
tation actions, see Hagen, supra note 1, at 78-88.
21. Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1933.
22. Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784, 788 (Mont. 1990) (asserting primary
issue courts confront in accountant liability cases is degree of care auditor owes
to third parties).
23. Bily, 834 P.2d at 761. The Bily court explained that " '[d]uty' is... only
an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the
law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection." Id. (quoting
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734 (1968)); see also Rosenblum v. Adler, 461
A.2d 138, 147 (N.J. 1983). The Rosenblum court stated that the question of
whether a duty exists involves a balancing of three elements: the relationship
between the parties, the level of risk, and the "public interest" in resolving the
issue in favor of a particular party. Id.; see also Paschall, supra note 1, at 707.
Paschall notes that "[w]hich particular third parties are, in fact, foreseeable users
of the accountant's work product is a policy decision that determines the extent
of the accountant's liability." Id. at 707.
24. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 752; Thayer, 793 P.2d at 788; KEETON ET AL., supra
note 20, § 107.
25. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
26. Bily, 834 P.2d at 752. Principle cases ofjurisdictions which apply Jus-
tice Cardozo's approach include the following: Colonial Bank of Alabama v. Rid-
ley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d 390 (Ala. 1989); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First
Bancorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1989); Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784
(Mont. 1990); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180 (Neb.
1989); William Iselin & Co. v. Landau, 522 N.E.2d 21 (N.Y. 1988); Landell v.
Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919). Several states have adopted some form of the
1993] NOTE 255
7
Checchia: Accountants' Liability to Third Parties under Bily v. Arthur Youn
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1993
256 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38: p. 249
Three jurisdictions have expanded auditor liability to those reasonably
foreseeable third parties who relied on the audit report.2 7 The majority
ofjurisdictions, however, have imposed liability under some variation of
section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which permits third parties
to recover only if they were the intended or foreseen beneficiaries of the
auditor's statements.2 8 In order to appreciate the controversy regard-
ing the appropriate liability standard, a review and analysis of each ap-
proach is necessary.
2 9
C. Justice Cardozo's Privity Relationship.
The development of the privity doctrine in third party negligence
claims traces back to Winterbottom v. Wright.30 In Winterbottom, the driver
of a mail coach brought a negligence action against the mail coach re-
pairer for physical injuries caused by the poor condition of the coach. 3 1
privity doctrine through legislation. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Michie
Supp. 1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 5535.1 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-402(b) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-26-12 (Supp. 1990).
27. Bily, 834 P.2d at 752. Included in this list are Mississippi, New Jersey
and Wisconsin. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So.
2d 315 (Miss. 1987); Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Citi-
zens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
28. Bily, 834 P.2d at 752. Principle cases of numerous jurisdictions have
adopted some form of the Restatement. See First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v.
Monco Agency Inc., 911 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990) (Louisiana law); Ingram In-
dus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (Kentucky law); Bunge v.
Eide, 372 F. Supp 1058 (D.N.D. 1974) (North Dakota law); Rusch Factors, Inc. v.
Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (Rhode Island law); First Fla. Bank N.A. v.
Max Mithchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990); Badische Corp. v. Caylor 356
S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987); Pahre v. Auditor of State 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988);
Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockier, P.C. v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70, (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989), leave to appeal denied, 450 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1990); Bonhiver v.
Graft 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 1976); Aluma Craft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co.
493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Spherex Inc. V. Alexander Grant & Co.,
451 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1982); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, 367 S.E.2d 609
(N.C. 1988); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212
(Ohio 1982); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1990) (adopting modified form of Restatement); Shatterproof Glass
Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); Haberman v. Public
Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987); First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford,
386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989).
29. For additional background on these liability standards, see Bily, 834
P.2d at 752-60; Gossman, supra note 5, at 100-09; Paschall, supra note 1, at 707-
21; Boveri & Marshall, Note, supra note 5, at 282-9 1; Lazare, Note, supra note 16,
at 880-94.
30. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. of Pleas 1842); see also Paschall, supra note 1, at
707 (discussing origins and development of privity doctrine); Lazare, Note, supra
note 16, at 880 (same).
31. Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 402. Defendant Wright was a repairer
and manufacturer of mail coaches. Id. Wright contracted with the Postmaster
General to maintain the coaches in a safely operating condition. Id. at 402-03.
The Defendant breached his obligations, thereby causing injury to the coach
driver, Winterbottom. Id. at 403.
8
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The court held that the plaintiff could not recover because there was no
privity of contract between the defendant and plaintiff.3 2 This privity
doctrine, barring a few exceptions, 3 3 remained intact until Justice Car-
dozo, in MacPherson v. Buick, 34 expanded the scope of manufacturers'
liability to those parties who could foreseeably be harmed by a manufac-
turer's negligently made product. 35 In MacPherson, Buick Motor Com-
pany sold an automobile to a car dealership, which in turn sold it to the
plaintiff.36 The plaintiff was injured when one of the car's wheels crum-
bled and caused the car to crash. 37 The court, responding to social and
industrial change, 38 disregarded the privity of contract doctrine and al-
lowed the third party plaintiff to recover under the theory of
negligence.
3 9
Several years later, in Glanzer v. Shephard,40 the privity doctrine was
32. Id. at 405. In his discussion of the consequences of recognizing third
party liability in this situation, Lord Abinger stated:
[I]f the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing
along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might
bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such con-
tracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and
outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue.
Id. The Winterbottom court, however, did recognize an exception where the bene-
fit of the contract was for a particular third party. Id. at 405 (distinguishing Levy
v. Langridge, 150 Eng. Rep. 1458 (Ex. Ch. 1838), in which defendant seller of
defective gun was found liable for injuries of specifically known third party user).
33. See Schemerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns. 138, 139 (N.Y. 1806)
(holding that when contract is made for benefit of third party, third party can
bring cause of action on contract). Shortly after the decision in Winterbottom, the
New York Court of Appeals disregarded the privity doctrine for suppliers of
inherently dangerous products. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). In
Thomas, the court held that a dealer in poisonous drugs who negligently misla-
beled his product owed a duty of care to third party users. Id. at 397. The court
held that "death or great bodily harm of some person" was a certain conse-
quence of mislabeling poison. Id. at 409. For a further discussion of the Thomas
holding, see Lazare, Note, supra note 16, at 882.
34. 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1051.
37. Id. The car collapsed when a defective wheel crumbled, throwing the
plaintiff from the car. Id. The defect could have been discovered by the manu-
facturer through reasonable inspection. Id.
38. See Paschall, supra note 1, at 708 (asserting that "concerns for human
life and public safety" played major role in MacPherson holding).
39. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. Justice Cardozo stated:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger.
Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be expected. If to the
element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be used
by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is
under a duty to make it carefully.
Id.
40. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
9
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similarly weakened in the area of professional services. In Glanzer, a
merchant retained the services of a public weigher for the purpose of
confirming the weight of beans sold to the plaintiffs. 41 The defendant
public weigher negligently misstated the weight of beans.42 The plain-
tiffs relied on the public weighers misstatements, suffered financial loss,
and sued the public weigher for recovery. 4 3 The court held that the
public weigher had a duty of care to the third party plaintiffs because
"[t]he plaintiffs' use of the certificates was not an indirect or collateral
consequence of the action of the weighers ... [but] was a consequence
which, to the weighers' knowledge, was the end and aim of the
transaction."
'4 4
Following Glanzer, the privity issue again surfaced in Ultramares Cor-
poration v. Touche,45 where the New York Court of Appeals determined
the scope of an independent auditor's liability to third parties. 46 In Ul-
tramares, plaintiff Ultramares Corporation (Ultramares) issued unsecured
loans totalling $165,000 to Fred Stern and Company (Stern). 4 7 Stern
subsequently went bankrupt and defaulted on its loans.4 8 Ultramares
brought fraud and negligence actions against Stern's independent audi-
tors, claiming that it had relied on the auditor's opinion to issue loans to
Stern. 4 9 The auditors negligently reported that Stern had assets in ex-
41. Id.
42. Id. The plaintiff contracted to purchase 905 bags of beans from Bech,
Van Siclen & Company (Bech). Id. The price of the beans was determined by
"weight sheets," which were certified by public weighers. Id. Bech contracted
with the defendant public weighers to weigh and certify the beans and to deliver
a copy of the certified weight sheets to the plaintiffs. Id. The beans were sold to
the plaintiffs for a price determined by the certified weigh sheets. Id. The plain-
tiff, in attempting resale, found that the weight of the beans was overestimated
by nearly 12,000 pounds. Id.
43. Id. The plaintiffs lost $1,261.26 by overpaying for the beans. Id.
44. Id. In supporting this position, the court reasoned that the defendant
public weigher knew that his certificate would be relied on for the sale of beans
and sent a copy of the certificate directly to the third party customer for the
"purpose of inducing action." Id. at 275-76. The differences between the hold-
ings in Glanzer and in MacPherson, however, are notable. In Glanzer, Justice Car-
dozo did not extend liability to all foreseeable users of the weigher's services.
Id. Instead, Cardozo limited recovery only to those parties whom the weigher
specifically intended and knew would rely on his information. Id. By providing
examples of title searchers and attorneys, Cardozo implicitly distinguished be-
tween a provider of erroneous information and a manufacturer of negligently
made products. Id. at 276.
45. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
46. Id. at 442.
47. Id.
48. Id. Fred Stern & Company imported and sold rubber. Id. The nature
of Stern's business necessitated obtaining "extensive credit" and borrowing
large sums of money from lenders. Id.
49. Id. at 443. In March 1924, Stern approached the plaintiff and requested
loans to finance its operations. Id. The plaintiff had a previous relationship with
Stern and lent money to Stern on the condition that Stern provide a certified
balance sheet. Id. It was customary practice for Fred Stern & Company to pro-
258
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cess of one million dollars, although, in reality, the company was insol-
vent. 50 The auditor had supplied Stern with thirty-two copies of its
opinion and had known that Stern would use the opinion to solicit capi-
tal from third parties. 5 ' The New York Court of Appeals held that the
defendant auditor owed no duty of care to third parties. 52 It stated that
"[i]f liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the fail-
ure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries,
may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."153 The court did recog-
nize, however, that in certain situations, the relationship between the
auditor and a third party would be "so close as to approach that of
privity.
' '54
vide certified balance sheets to all of its potential lenders, sellers, buyers or
shareholders. Id. at 442. The plaintiff relied on the certified balance sheet and
made a series of loans to Stern. Id. at 443.
50. Id. at 442. An employee of the Stern company fraudulently posted
fictitious sales, accounts payable and inflated inventory totalling over one mil-
lion dollars. Id. The defendant's agent who was assigned to audit Stern failed to
investigate these questionable postings. Id. The court concluded that the audit
was performed negligently and stated that "[a] cautious auditor might have been
dissatisfied [with the suspicious postings] and [would] have uncovered what was
wrong." Id. at 444.
51. Id. at 442. For three years, the defendants had performed similar serv-
ices for Stern. Id. The defendant, however, had no actual knowledge of any
particular user who relied on the audit. Id.
52. Id. at 444.
53. Id.; see also Dean Foust, The Big Six Are In Big Trouble, Bus. WK., April 6,
1992, at 78 (stating that accounting industry is defending legal claims totalling
two billion dollars in potential damages).
54. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931). For exam-
ple, under this analysis, if Stern had specifically told the defendant that the pri-
mary use of the independent audit was for the plaintiffs and that the audit should
be specifically delivered to the plaintiff, the court may have found the existing
relationship sufficiently "close as to approach privity." Paschall, supra note 1, at
711. Instead, the court held that the defendant's service was performed primar-
ily for the benefit of Stern and only "incidentally and collaterally" for the plain-
tiffs. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 446. Accordingly, the court distinguished this case
from the holding in Glanzer, where the sale of beans to a third party was the "end
and aim of the transaction" between the merchant and the weigher. Id. Several
commentators have linked Ultramares with Glanzer and refer to the combination
as the "primary benefit rule." Lazare, Note, supra note 16, at 885 & n.38.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed and clarified the restrictive Ul-
tramares approach in Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110
(N.Y. 1985). The Credit Alliance court created a three-part test to determine an
accountant's liability to a particular third party. Id. at 118. The court stated that
a third party must prove the following in order to recover:
(1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial reports
were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the further-
ance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3)
there must have been some conduct on the part of the accountants link-
ing them to that party or parties, which evinces the accountant's under-
standing of that party or parties' reliance.
Id. Although this test is similar to the Restatement approach, the third prong (the
11
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Commentators suggest that important economic and legal policy
considerations may have motivated the court's decision in Ultramares.55
First, because the accounting industry was still in its infancy stage, the
court may have wanted to protect it from exposure to extensive financial
liability.5 6 Second, the court believed that expanding the scope of liabil-
ity in this case would have a precedential effect on other professions. 5 7
Finally, the court sought to punish negligence less severely than inten-
tional fraud.5 8 It stated that if it expanded liability to third party negli-
gence claims, the same penalty would result for negligence as for
fraud.
59
Although the Ultramares decision has been criticized by judges and
commentators, 60 it remains the standard in at least nine states and has
linking prong) of the Credit Alliance test requires not only that the third party be
known to the auditor, but also that the auditor "either directly convey the audit
report to the third person or otherwise act in some manner specifically calcu-
lated to induce reliance on the report." Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d
745, 755 (Cal. 1992). For a further discussion of the Restatement approach, see
infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text. The Bily court criticized the Credit Alli-
ance test because the third prong of the test, known as the linking prong, fails to
illustrate what type of conduct is necessary for its satisfaction. Bily, 834 P.2d at
754. The Bily court noted, however, that the linking prong will probably be fur-
ther defined as similar cases are adjudicated. Id. at 755.
55. Paschall, supra note 1, at 712-14; Boveri & Marshall, Note, supra note 5,
at 284.
56. Boveri & Marshall, Note, supra note 5, at 284 (recognizing that account-
ing was not mulit-million dollar industry but rather newly emerging profession);
see also Paschall, supra note 1, at 713-14. Paschall states that in Ultramares, Car-
dozo was concerned with protecting the young accounting industry from the
dangers of extensive liability. Paschall, supra note 1, at 713-14. This concern
was evidenced by Cardozo's reference to Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159
N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928). Paschall, supra note 1, at 714 n.101. The Rensselaer case
involved the "fledgling" public waterworks industry, which would have been
damaged by an expansion of liability. Id. Paschall further notes thatJustice Car-
dozo's policy rationales are outdated because his analysis centered around the
accounting industry when it was still considered to be an unimportant practice
and not the "powerful, prestigious entity that it is today." Id.
57. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 447. Cardozo provided several examples of how
the expansion of negligence in this case would affect other professions. Id. In
the legal profession, Cardozo stated that lawyers certifying the validity of corpo-
rate or municipal bonds would be exposed to liability from investors. Id. Addi-
tionally, in the real estate industry, Cardoza noted that title companies insuring
titles to tracts of land would be liable to third parties "who may wish the benefit
of a policy without payment of a premium." Id.
58. Id. at 447. But see Boveri & Marshall, Note, supra note 5, at 285. Boveri
and Marshall concede that punishing intentional actions more severely than neg-
ligent acts is a valid policy. Id. They argue, however, that imposing harsher
penalties for intentional acts is preferable to denying recovery for negligent
ones. Id.
59. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 447.
60. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 774 (Cal. 1992) (Ken-
nard, J., dissenting); International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221 (1986) (outlining significant changes in role of
independent auditors since Ultramares,). In Bily, Justice Kennard criticized the
260 [Vol. 38: p. 249
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been incorporated into several state statutes.
6 '
D. The Restatement Approach: The Foreseen Party
The majority of states have rejected the privity approach taken in
Ultramares in favor of the more flexible Restatement approach. For exam-
ple, in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin,6 2 the United States District Court for
the District of Rhode Island discarded the privity doctrine 63 and instead
applied section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 64 Section 552
limits the liability of a supplier of information in a negligence action to
those persons or group of persons to which the supplier 1) specifically
intends to furnish the information, or 2) specifically knows will receive
the information. 6 5 The defendant auditor in Rusch had specific knowl-
majority's application of the privity doctrine and stated that the majority,
"[rummaging in the archives of legal history, amidst the debris of discarded
dogmas ... retrieves and revives, as an element of a cause of action for negli-
gence, the requirement of privity, which this court had described more than 20
years ago as 'virtually abandoned in California.' " Bily, 834 P.2d at 775 (Ken-
nard, J., dissenting) (quoting Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal.2d 223, 227 (1969)); see also
Paschall, supra note 1, at 712. Paschall believes that although Cardozo may have
had legitimate policy reasons for limiting an auditor's liability in 1931, the Ul-
tramares standard is not applicable to the accounting profession as it exists today.
Id. at 712-14; see also T. J. Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountant's Responsibilities to
Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31, 107 (1975) (arguing that auditor's "current
public service status" makes Ultramares decision obsolete); Wiener, supra note 5,
at 250 (stating that auditing functions and responsibilities have significantly
changed since Ultramares). But see Gossman, supra note 5, at 116-17. Gossman
argues that since Ultramares, the role of the auditor has not changed; rather, a
class of third parties relying on cost-free audits has emerged. Id. Gossman as-
serts that the real issue in determining the scope of an auditor's liability is
whether "an auditor owe[s] a duty of care to this new class of freeloaders." Id. at
117.
61. For a listing of legislative adoption of the Ultramares decision, see supra
note 26.
62. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
63. Id. at 91-93.
64. Id. The district court criticized the Ultramares approach because it failed
to provide recovery for innocent third parties, failed to equitably spread the risk
of loss, and failed to encourage due care in the accounting profession. Id. at 90.
65. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 states in pertinent part:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, sup-
plies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise rea-
sonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsec-
tion (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
13
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edge that the creditor plaintiff would rely on its unqualified opinion.
6 6
Thus, the court held that the limited group of investors whose reliance
on the audit was actually foreseen should not be barred from recovery.
6 7
The Rusch decision demonstrates how the Restatement approach di-
verges from the holdings in Ultramares and Glanzer. The latter decisions
require specific identification of the intended beneficiaries before liabil-
ity can be imposed. The Restatement, however, requires only that the
beneficiaries "belong to an identifiable group for whom the information
was intended to be furnished." s6 8 The Restatement approach, however, is
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a
substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the informa-
tion extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose
benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is in-
tended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(l)-(3) (1977). The Restatement provides
the following illustrations in explaining the scope of an auditor's third party
liability:
5. A is negotiating with X Bank for a credit of $50,000. The Bank requires
an audit by independent public accountants. A employs B & Company, a firm of
accountants, to make the audit, telling them that the purpose of the audit is to
meet the requirements of X Bank in connection with a credit of $50,000. B &
Company agrees to make the audit, with the express understanding that it is for
transmission to X Bank only. X Bank fails, and A, without any further communi-
cation with B & Company, submits its financial statements accompanied by B &
Company's opinion to Y Bank, which in reliance upon it extends a credit of
$50,000 to A. The audit is so carelessly made as to result in an unqualified
favorable opinion on financial statements that materially misstates the financial
position of A, and in consequence Y Bank suffers pecuniary loss through its ex-
tension of credit. B & Company is not liable to Y Bank.
6. The same facts as in Illustration 5, except that nothing is said about
supplying the information for the guidance of X Bank only, and A merely in-
forms B & Company that he expects to negotiate a bank loan, for $50,000, re-
quires the audit for the purpose of the loan, and has X Bank in mind. B &
Company is subject to liability to Y Bank.
Id. § 552 cmt. h, illus. 5 & 6.
66. Rusch Factors, 284 F. Supp. at 93. Plaintiff Rusch Factors was a commer-
cial banking corporation. Id. at 86. In 1963 and 1964, a Rhode Island company
approached the plaintiff for financing. Id. The plaintiff requested certified fi-
nancial statements from the company to review its financial condition. Id. The
defendant auditor prepared a report that erroneously certified that the company
was solvent, when in reality it was insolvent. Id. The plaintiff relied on this inac-
curate information to its detriment and suffered losses of $120,000. Id. The
record indicated that the defendant knew that the certified financial statements
would be utilized by and "had as its very aim and purpose, the reliance of poten-
tial financiers of the Rhode Island corporation." Id. at 93.
67. Id. at 92-93. Although the court adopted the Restatement approach, it
did not foreclose the possibility that the Rhode Island Supreme Court might
adopt the Ultramares approach if given the appropriate factual circumstances. Id.
at 91. The district court, however, avoided the issue by comparing the present
case to Glanzer, where the third party's reliance was foreseen by the defendant.
Id.
68. Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 145 (N.J. 1983). The Restatement
specifically states that "the negligent supplier of misinformation [is liable] only
14
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similar to the privity doctrine because both standards focus on the
knowledge and intent of the independent auditor for determining
whether liability should be imposed.
6 9
Although the majority of states adopt some variation of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 552 when determining an accountant's third
party liability, 70 the approach has been criticized by some commentators
who contend that there is no rational reason for protecting a foreseen
third party over a foreseeable one.7 1 Moreover, the Restatement provides
a relatively easy way for accountants to relieve themselves of third party
liability by not inquiring about the use of their audits.
7 2
E. Rosenblum and the Reasonably Foreseeable Standard
While New York continued to uphold the privity doctrine and other ju-
risdictions were adopting the Restatement approach to auditors' liability,
the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rosenblum v. Adler 73 jumped to the
other end of the liability spectrum. The court held that independent
auditors are liable to reasonably foreseeable third parties who justifiably
relied on the auditor's statements. 74 In Rosenblum, plaintiff stock pur-
chasers brought action for negligent misrepresentation against Touche
Ross & Company (Touche), who audited the financial statements of Gi-
to those persons for whose benefit and guidance it is supplied .... [However] it
is not necessary that the maker should have any particular person in mind as the
intended, or even the probable, recipient of the information." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h.
69. See Paschall, supra note 1, at 44; see also Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 145 (stat-
ing that both Restatement and Ultramares approaches require relationship between
auditor and third party).
70. For a listing ofjurisdictions adopting the Restatement approach, see supra
note 28.
71. Wiener, supra note 5, at 252. Justice Wiener states that:
The placing of liability on the fortuitousness of whether the name of
the bank is disclosed or whether a class of lending institutions were
known to the accounting firm may be a comfortable line to be drawn by
those preparing the Restatement, but it does not appear to rest on sound
analytical considerations. If the purpose of imposing liability is to in-
crease the flow of accurate information this hardly turns on the state of
mind of the accountant.
Id.; see also Boveri & Marshall, Note, supra note 5, at 287 (stating that both fore-
seen and foreseeable parties receive audit for free and therefore should not be
subject to different standards of care).
72. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 784 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard,J.,
dissenting). Justice Kennard states that an auditor can evade liability by simply
agreeing with his or her client "to remain blissfully unaware of the report's pro-
posed distribution and the uses to which it will be put." Id. (Kennard, J., dis-
senting); see also Boveri & Marshall, Note, supra note 5, at 287 (arguing that "a
clever accountant could circumvent the Restatement provision by asking his cli-
ent not to reveal the intended users of the statement").
73. 461 A.2d 138, 153 (N.J. 1983).
74. Id. at 153.
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ant Stores Corporation (Giant).7 5 Touche failed to recognize that Gi-
ant's financial statements were fraudulent. 76 The plaintiff, relying on
Touche's unqualified audit report, sold its operations to Giant in ex-
change for Giant common stock. 7 7 The stock was worthless and Giant
went into bankruptcy. 7 8 The court held that, unless auditors issued a
statement limiting the distribution of their opinion, their duty of care
extended to those reasonably foreseeable third parties who received the
auditor's statement from the audited company and who relied on the
statements to make business decisions.
7 9
The court based its holding on several policy reasons. 80 First, the
court stated that the function of an audit has evolved from an internal
management resource to an independent evaluation mechanism for in-
terested third parties. 8 1 Second, the court believed that expanded liabil-
ity would produce more careful and comprehensive auditing reviews
and encourage the adoption of stricter standards, which would effec-
tively reduce liability. 82 Third, the court opined that losses should be
shifted to the party who is in the best position to control and manage the
loss. 83 In this situation, the court reasoned that accountants could pro-
tect themselves from loss by acquiring insurance. 84 Finally, the court
75. Id. at 140. Giant managed retail catalog showrooms, gift shops, and
discount department stores. Id. Defendant Touche was Giant's independent au-
ditor from 1969 through 1972. Id.
76. Id. Giant falsified its books in 1971 and 1972 by recording non-existing
assets and by omitting substantial liabilities. Id. at 141. The discrepancies were
discovered in 1973 after Touche had issued unqualified opinions on Giant's fi-
nancial statements. Id. The Securities and Exchange Commission reported that
Touche's 1972 audit of Giant "did not meet the requirements of the accounting
profession." Id. at 141 n.l.
77. Id. at 141. The report stated that "it had examined the statements of
earnings and balance sheets 'in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards' and that the financial statements 'present[ed] fairly' Giant's financial
position." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 153. The court never addressed whether an auditor's duty ex-
tended to third parties such as institutional or portfolio managers receiving the
statements second hand. See id. at 152.
80. Id. at 147-52.
81. Id.; cf Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (N.Y. 1931)
(doubting whether typical businessperson would place much weight on such
evaluation).
82. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 152. This contention, however, is subject to crit-
icism. See, e.g., Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1959-60 (arguing that level of care may
not increase with expansion of liability).
83. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 151.
84. Id. at 151 & n.l 1. The court noted the availability and affordability of
liability insurance. Id. Moreover, although the defendants asserted that the cost
of insurance under the foreseeability approach would be catastrophic, it pro-
vided no evidence to support its contention. Id. Several commentators have
criticized the Rosenblum rationale concerning insurance. See, e.g., Lazare, Note,
supra note 16, at 910 (stating that Rosenblum risk of loss analysis is "oversimpli-
fied and misleading"). For a discussion of the potential negative effects the fore-
264
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stated that accountant's liability in this situation has certain "built-in
limits" and, as a result, is not limitless as stated in Ultramares.8 5
The Supreme Courts of Mississippi and Wisconsin have also
adopted foreseeability standards for assessing an accountants liability to
third parties.8 6 Following Rosenblum, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & C0. 87 based its decision on policy
considerations, including the protection of innocent third parties, risk
allocation and deterrence.8 8 The court also concluded that limiting lia-
bility would hurt the general economy: "[i]f relying [third party credi-
tors] are not allowed to recover, the cost of credit to the general public
will increase because creditors will either have to absorb the cost of bad
loans . . . or hire independent accountants to verify the information
received." 89
F. California Law Before Bily: International Mortgage and the
Foreseeability Test
In 1986, the California Court of Appeal had also adopted the fore-
seeability approach for accountants' liability cases. The court held in
International Mortgage v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corporation90 that an ac-
countant was liable to those reasonably foreseeable third parties who
relied on the accountant's certified financial statements. 91 In this case,
the plaintiff mortgage company, in reliance upon certified financial
statements prepared by defendant accountant, entered into loan trans-
actions with Westside Mortgage, Inc.9 2 The financial statements were
seeability approach would have on auditors' ability to obtain insurance, see
Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1950.
85. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 152.
86. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315
(Miss. 1987); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361
(Wis. 1983). In Citizens State, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an ac-
countant is liable for all "foreseeable injuries resulting from their negligent
acts," except when public policy dictates otherwise in a particular case. Citizens
State, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
87. 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
88. Id. at 365. The court reasoned that because third parties are generally
the primary users of an auditor's report, they should be protected. Id. at 365 &
n.10. The court also stated that if negligent accountants were not held liable to
third parties, their negligent acts would continue undeterred. Id. at 365. The
court, however, provided no support for this statement. Moreover, the court
provided no information or illustrations to support their contention that ac-
countants can spread the risk of their liability through insurance.
89. Id.
90. 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
91. Id. at 227.
92. Id. at 219. Westside Mortgage, Inc. (Westside) arranged loans for
qualified buyers and sold these loans to other mortgage bankers. Id. Interna-
tional Mortgage Company (IMC), wanting to buy and sell loans, contacted West-
side. Id. Westside delivered to IMC its certified financial statements that had
been prepared by defendantJohn P. Butler Accountancy Corporation. Id. After
1993] NOTE
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inaccurate and Westside defaulted on its loan. 93 The defendant had no
knowledge of the plaintiff mortgage company and was unaware that it
reviewed or relied upon the certified financial statements. 94 In deter-
mining whether defendant's legal duty extended to the third plaintiff,
the court rejected the privity doctrine and the Restatement approach.
9 5
The court maintained that existing California civil and common laws
held every person responsible for their foreseeable negligent acts and
that any exceptions to this rule must be "clearly supported by public
policy." 9 6 The court found no policy considerations sufficient to relieve
an auditor's duty of care to foreseeable third parties. 9 7 The court con-
cluded that society is better protected by holding auditors liable to fore-
seeable third parties because such liability will provide a "financial
disincentive" for negligent auditing.
9 8
Several years after International Mortgage was decided, the California
Supreme Court in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. 99 reviewed the issue of what
liability standard should be used in professional negligence and negli-
gent misrepresentation claims against independent auditors. The Bily
reviewing the financial statements, IMC entered into an agreement with West-
side to buy and sell government loans. Id.
93. Id. The financial statements in question reported Westside's net worth
at $175,036. Id. Westside's primary asset, a $100,000 note receivable on real
property, proved to be worthless. Id. The misrepresentation damaged IMC be-
cause Westside's net worth without the note failed to meet the required stan-
dards for certain governmental loans. Id. Consequently, Westside's inability to
deliver trust deeds resulted in alleged damages of more than $400,000 to IMC.
Id.
94. Id. at 220.
95. Id. at 226-27. In rejecting both the Ultramares approach and the Restate-
ment approach, the court stated that the "protectionist rule of privity" advanced
in Ultramares can no longer be followed in light of the existing obligations an
auditor has to the public. Id. Moreover, the court found that the Restatement
standard fails to represent the state's "concept of tort liability for negligence."
Id.
96. Id. at 227. The International Mortgage court cited the California Civil
Code § 1714, which states that "[e]very one is responsible, not only for the re-
sult of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person .. " Id.
(citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1986)). The court also referred to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's decision in Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1969), to
support its holding. International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227. In Heyer, the
court held that a lawyer who prepares a will owes a duty to the client's intended
beneficiaries as well as to the client himself. Heyer, 449 P.2d at 165. The Heyer
court concluded that "public policy requires that the attorney exercise his posi-
tion of trust and superior knowledge responsibly so as not to affect adversely
persons whose rights and interests are certain and foreseeable." Id.; see also
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). The Christian court held
that, barring a statutory provision limiting liability, a person is liable for harm
caused by his or her negligent conduct unless public policy dictates otherwise.
Id.
97. International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
98. Id.
99. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
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court adopted the privity standard for professional negligence claims
and the Restatement approach for claims of negligent misrepresenta-
tion. 0 0 In reaching this decision, the court rejected the foreseeability
standard adopted in International Mortgage. 1'0 The court, advancing vari-
ous policy considerations, outlined its reasons for imposing stricter lia-
bility standards in the accounting field.'
0 2
III. CASE DISCUSSION: BILY V. ARTHUR YOUNG & CO.
In Bily, investors in the Osborne Computer Company (Osborne)
brought action against Arthur Young & Company (Arthur Young) for
professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation and fraud.'
0 3 Os-
borne hired Arthur Young to audit its 1981 and 1982 financial state-
ments. 10 4 After review, Arthur Young issued an unqualified audit
100. Id. at 747.
101. Id. at 767.
102. For a discussion of the policy considerations outlined by the majority,
see infra notes 118-45 and accompanying text.
103. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 748-49 (Cal. 1992). Os-
borne developed and marketed the first portable personal computer in 1981. Id.
at 747. By 1982, Osborne earned over $10 million in revenues per month and
became one of the fastest growing companies in American history. Id. At the
end of 1982, Osborne initiated plans to make a public offering of its stock. Id.
Osborne sold warrants to investors in order to meet the capital requirements
necessary for a public offering. Id. Warrants are instruments sold in exchange
for loans or for "letters of credit" used to obtain loans. Id. The warrants per-
mitted investors to buy blocks of Osborne's stock at "favorable" prices which
would lead to substantial profits when (or if) Osborne went "public." Id. The
plaintiffs were individuals and pension and capital investment funds who
purchased warrants and common stock from Osborne. Id. One of the investors,
Robert Bily purchased 37,000 shares of stock from Osborne for $1.5 million. Id.
104. Id. Arthur Young at the time was part of the "Big Eight" accounting
firms. Id. Subsequently, Arthur Young merged with Ernst & Whinney (another
"Big Eight" firm) to form Ernst & Young in 1990. Id. Currently, Ernst & Young
is now part of the "Big Six" accounting firms. Id. Included in the "Big Six" are:
1) Arthur Andersen & Company; 2) Coopers & Lybrand; 3) Deloitte & Touche;
4) Ernst & Young; 5) KPMG Peat Marwick; and 6) Price Waterhouse. The "Big
Six" audits nearly 90% of all publicly traded corporations with annual revenues
of at least one million dollars. J. MICHAEL COOK ET AL., THE LIABILITY CRISIS IN
THE UNITED STATES: IMPACT ON THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION, A STATEMENT OF
POSITION 4 (1992) (citing WHO AUDITS AMERICA 393-96 (25th ed. 1991)). More-
over, the "Big Six" audit nearly all of the country's largest corporations, includ-
ing the following: 494 of the Fortune 500 industrials; 97 of the Fortune 100
fastest growing companies; 99 of the Fortune 100 largest commercial banks; 92
of the top 100 defense contractors; and 195 of the 200 largest insurance compa-
nies. Id. In its capacity as an auditor, Arthur Young was responsible for "re-
view[ing] the annual financial statements prepared by [Osborne's] in-house
accounting department, examin[ing Osborne's] books and records . . . and
issu[ing] an audit opinion on the financial records." Bily, 834 P.2d at 747. For
auditing purposes, the client's financial statements must include the following
documents: a balance sheet, an income statement, a statement showing changes
in retained earnings, a statement of changes in financial position and a disclo-
sure of changes in other categories of shareholder equity. Lazare, Note, supra
note 16, at 877 & n.5 (citing S. DAVIDSON & R. WEIL, HANDBOOK OF MODERN
1993] NOTE
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opinion on Osborne's financial statements. 10 5 The 1982 financial state-
ment showed a net operating profit of $69,000 on revenues exceeding
six million dollars. 10 6 The plaintiff investors allegedly relied on Arthur
Young's opinion when making investments totalling six million dol-
lars. 10 7 In September of 1983, Osborne filed for bankruptcy and the
plaintiffs lost their investments.1
0 8
AcCOUrrING 2-2 to 2-3 (3d ed. 1983)). A balance sheet indicates the financial
condition of a company by reporting the company's assets, liabilities and
owner's equity. Id. The income statement presents the profitability of a com-
pany, over a specific time period, by reporting its gross revenues and expenses
and indicating whether the company realized a profit or suffered a loss. Id. The
statement of retained earnings reports the change in position, over a specific
time period, of earnings that the company has not distributed to its sharehold-
ers. Id. Statements reporting changes in shareholders' equity over time may
include stock dividends, splits and retirements and other transactions that affect
the interests of shareholders. Id.
105. Bily, 834 P.2d at 747. After reviewing the financial statements of a
client-company, an auditor issues an opinion on whether the company's financial
statements accurately represent its actual financial position. Paschall, supra note
1, at 701. An unqualified opinion states that the audit was performed "in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles" and that the client's
financial statements fairly present its financial condition. Id. The AICPA Audit
and Accounting Manual offers the following "boiler plate" unqualified opinion:
We have audited the accompanying balance sheets of X Company
as of December 31, 19X2 and 19X1, and the related statements of in-
come, retained earnings, and cash flows for the years then ended.
These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's
management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these fi-
nancial statements based on our audits.
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial
statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes exam-
ining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures
in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the ac-
counting principles used and significant estimates made by manage-
ment, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.
We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present
fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of X Company as of
December 31, 19X2 and 19Xl, and the results of its operations and its
cash flows for the years then ended in conformity with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles.
AICPA AUDIT & ACCOUNTING MANUAL § 102 10.010, at 10211 (CCH 1990). Ar-
thur Young printed 100 copies of the opinion for Osborne. Bily, 834 P.2d at
748.
106. Bily, 834 P.2d at 748.
107. Id. One plaintiff testified that he neither saw nor read the opinion. Id.
at 748 n.2. Thejury nonetheless issued a verdict in his and the other plaintiffs'
favor. Id. at 749.
108. Id. at 748. Both internal and external factors caused the demise of
Osborne. Id. In mid-1983, Osborne's sales fell sharply due to internal manufac-
turing problems. Id. The manufacturing problems related to Osborne's intro-
duction of its second generation computer, the Executive. Id. Once on the
market, the Executive cannibalized the sales of Osborne's first computer. Id.
20
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At trial, the plaintiffs' expert witness identified over forty deficien-
cies in Arthur Young's audit that he believed constituted gross profes-
sional negligence. 10 9 The expert witness concluded that the liabilities
on Osborne's 1982 statements were grossly underestimated and be-
lieved the reported $69,000 profit was actually a three million dollar
loss.' 10 At the close of trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs for professional negligence."' The California Court of Ap-
peal affirmed the trial court's decision."1
2
Although commentators believed that the California Supreme
Court would eventually adopt the foreseeability approach outlined in
International Mortgage," 3 the Bily court severely limited the scope of an
auditor's liability in negligence actions. 114 In deciding this issue, the
Bily court analyzed the scope of liability under two separate torts: gen-
eral negligence and negligent misrepresentation." 5 The Bily court ex-
pressly distinguished negligence from negligent misrepresentation.,"
6
Moreover, consumer demand for the Executive outstripped supply, and Os-
borne's sales consequently plummeted. Id. Osborne finally collapsed when IBM
entered the market with its own version of the personal computer. Id. After the
plaintiffs lost their entire investments, they brought suit against Arthur Young in
the Santa Clara County Superior Court. Id.. The plaintiffs originally filed sepa-
rate suits; however, these actions were consolidated for trial. Id.
109. Id. According to the expert, the majority of deficiencies came from
Arthur Young's failure to uncover Osborne's internal accounting weaknesses.
Id. Furthermore, the expert testified that Arthur Young actually discovered dis-
crepancies, but failed to report them. Id. A senior auditor detected $1.3 million
in unrecorded liabilities, such as customer rebates and product returns. Id. The
auditor recommended that Arthur Young inform Osborne's board of directors
of the deficiencies in Osborne's internal accounting system; however, his super-
visors at Arthur Young did not accept the recommendation, and no weaknesses
were reported. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 749. The jury, however, exonerated Arthur Young with respect
to the intentional fraud and negligent misrepresentation allegations. Id.
112. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 470, 472 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
113. See, e.g., Gossman, supra note 5, at 100 (asserting that International Mort-
gage holding would be affirmed by California Supreme Court, if reviewed).
114. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 757 (Cal. 1992).
115. Id. at 760-74. The Bily court also addressed a claim against Arthur
Young for intentional misrepresentation. See id. at 773-74. This Note, however,
will only discuss the courts analysis under negligence and negligent misrepre-
sentation, and will not address intentional misrepresentation.
116. Id. at 768. The Bily court noted that most jurisdictions have failed to
carefully or clearly distinguish the tort of negligence from the tort of negligent
misrepresentation. Id. The court explained that negligent misrepresentation is
a distinct tort emanating from the tort of deceit. Id. Moreover, the court as-
serted that a "clear and careful" distinction is necessary for two reasons: 1) be-
cause the two torts have different statutory foundations, and 2) because the
distinction has practical implications especially in complex litigation cases. Id.
For example, in jury instructions, a general negligence claim focuses on the au-
ditor's "level of care and compliance with professional standards." Id. at 772.
Instructions for negligent misrepresentation, however, focus on the third party's
19931 NOTE 269
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The following sections analyze the court's holding under both theories
of negligence.
B. The Privity Approach for Auditor Negligence Actions
The Bily court held that under the tort of negligence, an auditor
owes no duty of care to persons other than the client when conducting
an audit." 17 The Bily court asserted that under California common law,
duty is determined by public policy, which involves the balancing of nu-
merous factors: 1) the extent to which the conduct was intended to af-
fect the third party; 2) the foreseeability of injury to the third party; 3)
the "degree of certainty" that the third party would suffer injury; 4) the
proximate connection between conduct and harm; 5) the morality of the
conduct; and 6) the policy of impeding future injury."l 8 After consider-
ing these factors, the court based its holding on three "central con-
cerns." 1' First, the court concluded that under the foreseeability
standard, an auditor is exposed to potential liability "far out of propor-
tion to its fault."' 20 Second, the court believed that due to the sophisti-
cation of third-party plaintiffs in auditor liability actions, privity is the
most appropriate standard.' 2 ' Finally, the court maintained that the
justifiable reliance on an auditor's opinions. Id. The Bily dissent, however,
found the application of different standards to the two negligence claims illogi-
cal. Id. at 775 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that, because the
two torts in this case were factually related and applied the same standard of
care to the auditor's conduct, they should not be distinguished. Id. (Kennard,J.,
dissenting). The dissent stated that it would be "anomalous to hold that the
class of persons to whom the accountant owes a duty varies depending on which
legal theory has been pleaded." Id. at 776 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see also Ro-
senblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 142 (N.J. 1983). In Rosenblum, the Supreme
Court of NewJersey stated that "[a] claim against the auditor is realistically one
predicated upon his representations. Though the theory advanced here by the
plaintiffs is directed to the service performed by accountants and thus is in the
nature of malpractice, their claim can be viewed as grounded in negligent mis-
representation." Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 142.
117. Bily, 834 P.2d at 747.
118. Id. at 761 (quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958)); see
also Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
In Citizens State, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the following public
policy reasons against the imposition of liability despite a finding of negligence:
1) the injury was too remote from the negligent act; 2) the injury was out of
proportion to the fault of the tortfeasor; 3) in retrospect, it appeared highly ex-
traordinary that the negligence brought about the harm; 4) the recovery would
have placed an unreasonable burden on the tortfeasor; 5) the allowance of re-
covery would likely open the door for fraudulent claims; and 6) the allowance of
recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. Citizens
State, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
119. Bily, 834 P.2d at 761.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1955. Siliciano states that third
parties in auditor negligent misrepresentation cases are mostly "sophisticated
commercial creditors" who are well experienced in risk assessment financial
transactions. Id.
270 [Vol. 38: p. 249
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol38/iss1/6
1993] NOTE 271
foreseeability approach failed to efficiently allocate loss and promote ac-
curate auditing. '
22
The Bily court held that endorsement of the foreseeability approach
in auditor liability cases would expose the auditor to "multibillion-dol-
lar" liability that is significantly out of proportion to the fault of the in-
dependent auditor. 123 The court contended that because independent
audits are conducted in a "client-controlled" environment, the quality
and accuracy of the audit is determined by the quality and accuracy of
the information supplied. 12 4 Furthermore, after the client obtains the
audit, the auditor loses control over who receives the audit. 125 There-
fore, the court concluded that despite the auditor's efforts, the client
maintains "primary control of the financial reporting process."'
1 26
Under these circumstances, the court noted that potential liability to all
foreseeable third parties is disproportionate to the fault of the auditor
who has limited control over the accuracy and dissemination of his
services. 127
The court's second reason for limiting an auditor's liability focused
on the sophistication and knowledge of the plaintiff in this type of ac-
tion. 128 The court noted that investors and creditors, through training
and experience, possess substantial knowledge concerning capital mar-
kets. 12 9 As a result, the court believed that these investors and creditors
should realize the limitations of a "broadly-phrased professional opin-
ion based on a necessarily confined examination." 1 30 The court distin-
guished the sophisticated plaintiff from the "presumptively powerless
consumer" in products liability actions, where the privity barrier has
been removed.' 3 ' Furthermore, unlike consumers in product liability
122. Bily, 834 P.2d at 761. Instead, the court agues that the foreseeability
approach promotes "dislocations of resources, including increased expense and
decreased availability of auditing services in some sectors of the economy." Id.
But see Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 152-53 (NJ. 1983) (imposing liability
on auditors provides for equitable distribution of loss resulting from auditor's
negligent conduct).
123. Bily, 834 P.2d at 764.
124. Id. at 760.
125. Id. at 762. The court noted that the dissemination of the audit report
was "within the exclusive province of client management." Id.; see also Lazare,
Note, supra note 16, at 902-04 (discussing problems associated with uncon-
trolled use and distribution of audit reports and advocating judicial limitations
on auditor's liability to prevent this "unique problem").
126. Bily, 834 P.2d at 762.
127. Id. at 763.
128. Id. at 765.
129. Id.
130. Id. The majority, however, did not take into consideration the fact
that some creditors, although sophisticated, still lack the financial resources to
conduct investigations outside of the independent audit. See id. at 785 (Kennard,
J., dissenting) (differentiating between "wealthy and financial savvy" third par-
ties and third parties with only "modest means").
131. Id. at 765.
23
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cases, the court opined that the sophisticated investor or lender could
reduce the risk of erroneous financial opinions by making contractual
arrangements with the client, by dealing directly with the client's audi-
tor, or by conducting its own audit.'
32
Finally, the court disagreed with the proposition that the foresee-
ability standard would ensure more careful audits and more effective
risk allocation. 33 The court stated that the expansion of liability would
not significantly increase auditing accuracy.1 34 The court supported this
contention by noting the auditor's dependence on the client for financial
information and the intensive work involved in preparing such an au-
dit. 135 The court concluded that expansion of an auditor's liability
would instead increase the price of audits.' 36 In addition, the court
noted that the imposition of liability would decrease the availability of
audits to businesses in young industries where failure rates are typically
high.137 Moreover, the court believed that losses from erroneous finan-
cial information are more efficiently absorbed by investors and credi-
tors, who can diversify their investment and loan portfolios.
13 8
132. Id. In summary, the court reasoned:
As a matter of economic and social policy, third parties should be
encouraged to rely on their own prudence, diligence, and contracting
power, as well as other informational tools. This kind of self-reliance
promotes sound investment and credit practices and discourages the
careless use of monetary resources. If, instead, third parties are simply
permitted to recover from the auditor for mistakes in the client's finan-
cial statements, the auditor becomes, in effect, an insurer of not only
the financial statements, but of bad loans and investments in general.
Id.
133. Id. at 765-66.
134. Id. at 766. But see Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (extending
auditor's duty to foreseeable third parties may promote more accurate audits
through stricter standards and tighter supervision); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin,
284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968) (foreseeability approach would raise caution-
ary procedures in accounting industry).
135. Bily, 834 P.2d at 766.
136. Id. The AICPA's code of ethics permits adjustment of price in relation
to the level of an auditor's responsibility: "In determining fees, a CPA may as-
sess the degree of responsibility assumed by undertaking an engagement as well
as the time, manpower and skills required to perform the service in conformity
with the standards of the profession." AICPA AUDITING STANDARDS: ORIGINAL
PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra note 20, at § 56.06.
137. Bily, 834 P.2d at 766; see also Foust, supra note 53, at 78 (reporting that
many accounting firms do not audit small businesses because they commonly are
target of lawsuits); Zabihollan Rezaee, Management of an Accounting Practice, CPA
J., May 1989, at 66-70. Rezaee cautions accountants to evaluate potential clients
thoroughly. Rezaee, supra, at 63. Before retaining a client, the accountant
should review the client's "integrity, ability to pay for services, management ex-
perience, and potential conflicts of interest." Id. The accountant should also
investigate whether the client was involved in any prior litigation. Id.
138. Bily, 834 P.2d at 766. But see Rusch Factors v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85,
91 (D.R.I. 1968) (noting that "risk of loss" more easily and fairly dispersed when
imposed on auditors who can, in turn, transfer cost to its customers). The Bily
court did not consider the issue of insurance for auditors. See Bily, 834 P.2d at
24
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For the preceding reasons, the California Supreme Court held that
under a claim for negligence, an auditor's liability for conducting an in-
dependent audit is limited to its client.' 3 9 The court, however, did offer
the possibility of recovery for a limited group of third parties under the
tort of negligent misrepresentation. 14 0
B. The Restatement Approach and Negligent Misrepresentation
In determining the scope of liability under the tort of negligent mis-
representation, the court concluded that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 552 was most accordant with the "elements and policy founda-
tions" of the tort. 14 ' First, the court noted that by limiting liability only
to those parties who were actually foreseen, an auditor can assess his
potential liability and make rational decisions about who to audit. 14 2
Moreover, the court stated that limiting liability to those parties who the
auditor actually intended to supply with information strengthens the
connection between the auditor's negligent conduct and the third
party's harm. 143 This connection, the court reasoned, prevents causa-
tion problems and makes reliance evidence more credible. 14 4 Finally,
the court concluded that, other than International Mortgage, California
courts have consistently required that the supplier of information intend
to act for the benefit of a third party or limited group of third parties in a
"specific and circumscribed transaction."1 4 5
C. Justice Kennard's Dissent
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Kennard stated that under California
law, an individual is liable for all reasonably foreseeable harm caused by
his or her negligence 14 6 and contended that any exceptions to this rule
must be supported by public policy.' 47 Justice Kennard then provided
766 & n. 14. Although this issue may have strengthened its holding, the majority
could not address it. See id. The only information supplied on the matter came
from amicus curiae briefs provided by the California Society of Certified Public
Accountants. See id. The brief included results of in-house industry surveys that
pertained in part to insurance availability and use in the accounting industry. Id.
The court declined to use the information because it found it biased. Id.
139. Id. at 767.
140. Id. at 768-73.




145. Id. at 771.
146. Id. at 776 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dissent looked to California
Civil Code § 1714(a) (West 1986). Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). The code spe-
cifically stated that "[e]very one is responsible, not only for the result of his [or
her] willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his [or her]
property or person .... " Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1714(a) (West 1986)).
147. Id. (Kennard,J., dissenting); see Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.
25
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several reasons why no exception to the existing foreseeability rule is
needed in the area of accountant liability.
14 8
In discussing the connection between an auditor's conduct and a
third party's injury, Justice Kennard asserted that due to common busi-
ness practices, foreseeability of harm to third parties relying on inaccu-
rate financial reports is readily apparent.149 Moreover, Justice Kennard
stated that economic loss to third parties is also apparent and relatively
simple to prove. 150 Moreover, Justice Kennard contended that once
justifiable reliance is established, the connection between an auditor's
conduct and the resulting third party's economic injury is sufficiently
close to warrant liability.'
5 '
The dissent also responded to the majority's view that the extension
of liability to third parties is unfair where the auditor's negligence is
slight in comparison to the client's errors. 152 Justice Kennard asserted
that proportionality of fault has no relevance in the determination of
3d 868, 885 (Cal. 1991) (holding every person liable for injuries caused by his or
her negligent conduct except where clearly supported by public policy); Row-
land v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112 (Cal. 1968) (same).
148. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 776-82 (Cal. 1992) (Ken-
nard, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 777 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished economic
harm from emotional distress. Id. It asserted that although emotional distress
can be easily feigned, economic loss can be accurately measured. Id. (Kennard,
J., dissenting). Several courts, however, have exempted a defendant from liabil-
ity in cases where the only injury is economic loss. See Robins Dry Dock & Re-
pair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1968). This view is referred to as the "economic loss doctrine." See
Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1941-51. For a comprehensive discussion advocating
the economic loss doctrine in the context of auditors' liability cases, see id. Jus-
tice Wiener asserted that the economic loss doctrine is unsound because eco-
nomic loss can be just as harmful as physical harm and therefore should not be
treated differently for liability purposes. Wiener, supra note 5, at 250. Justice
Wiener argued that a negligently prepared audit can inflict "pecuniary loss more
potent than the chisel or the crowbar." Id. (quoting United States v. Benjamin,
328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Howard v. United States, 377
U.S. 953 (1964)).
151. Bily, 834 P.2d at 777 (Kennard, J., dissenting). In order to recover
damages against an independent auditor, a plaintiff must prove that he or she
relied on the auditor's opinion and that this reliance caused his or her economic
injury. Id. at 777-78 (Kennard, J., dissenting). To prove reliance, the plaintiff
must establish that he or she reviewed the report and would not have entered
into a transactional relationship with the auditor's client but for the unqualified
opinion of the auditor's report. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Moreover, the
plaintiff must prove that his or her economic injury was a foreseeable outcome.
Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Assuming a third party can prove causation in this
manner, "the connection between the auditor's negligence and the third party's
injury must be judged close by any reasonable measure." Id. (KennardJ., dis-
senting). Although the majority did not refute the causal connection between an
auditor and a third party when reliance exists, it feared that reliance could be
easily fabricated and hard to disprove. Id. at 764.
152. Id. at 780 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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auditors' liability to third parties and should only be addressed in in-
demnity actions between the auditor and the client.'
5 3
The dissent also disagreed with the majority view that under the
foreseeability approach, accountants will be exposed to nearly limitless
liability. 15 4 It argued that proof of justifiable reliance, along with the
relatively short time period in which business information becomes ob-
solete, ensures "reasonably predictable" liability limits. 155 Moreover,
the dissent contended that there was no concrete evidence to support
the claim that expanded liability would impose an undue burden on ac-
countants.1 56 Justice Kennard asserted that if this burden was too great
in jurisdictions adopting the foreseeability standard, state legislature
would have intervened.
157
In discussing the auditor's work product, the dissent stated that lia-
bility will ensure more careful auditing practices and deter unlawful con-
duct. 158 The dissent highlighted that a deterrent effect is especially
appropriate for the auditing function because without potential third
party liability, accountants would have no motivation to act as carefully
as they should.' 59 Moreover, insofar as accountants are motivated by
the desire to satisfy their clients, who need favorable audits to obtain
capital, accountants would be more susceptible to client biases without
the threat of third party liability.'
60
In addressing the majority's holding under the negligent misrepre-
sentation claim, the dissent criticized the majority's adoption of the Re-
statement approach.161 It concluded no rational basis existed for favoring
153. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 781 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
156. Id., at 782-83 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that no
"competent evidence" was available to prove liability insurance was unobtain-
able or too expensive to acquire. Id. at 783 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dis-
sent also noted that accountants can control their potential liability by
establishing agreements with their clients that limit distribution of audit reports.
Id. at 785 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 783 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 781-82 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 782 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished this case from
emotional distress cases where liability to third parties has been restricted. Id.
(Kennard,J., dissenting). In emotional distress cases, there is no need to extend
liability to third parties because recovery by the person physically injured from a
negligent act provides adequate deterrence against similar future conduct. Id.
(Kennard, J., dissenting). Third party losses in an auditors' negligence claim
"are not a mere ripple effect of some primary wrong to a different party." Id.
(Kennard,J., dissenting). In most cases, the auditor's negligence does not injure
the client (in reality, an auditor's negligence may help clients); rather, such neg-
ligence primarily injures a third party investor or lender who relies on the inac-
curate information. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 784 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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foreseen users over foreseeable users.1 6 2 Justice Kennard contended
that the Restatement approach "penalizes knowledge and rewards igno-
rance."163 Justice Kennard theorized that, to avoid third party liability,
an auditor could simply communicate to the client his or her desire to
remain unaware of the audit's intended beneficiaries.1 64
For the foregoing reasons, the dissent concluded that an auditor
should be liable to those reasonably foreseeable third parties who rely
on the auditor's inaccurate information, regardless of the negligence
theory advanced. 1
6 5
In addressing the impact of the majority's decision, the dissent con-
cluded that the decision in BUy will have two major consequences. 16 6
First, the dissent opined that there would be no protection for reason-
ably foreseeable third parties who justifiably rely on an auditor's inaccu-
rate statements. 167 Second, because liability helps prevent inaccurate
financial information from entering "the waters of commerce," the dis-
sent believed that the majority's holding would have grave conse-
quences on California's economic community. 168 These consequences
162. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that there is no need
to distinguish these groups because neither group pays for the audit or is owed a
greater standard of care. Id. (Kennard,J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissent
opined that:
tlo allow liability to turn on the fortuitous occurrence that the ac-
countant's client specifically mentions a person or class of persons who
are to receive the reports, when the accountant may have that same
knowledge as a matter of business practice, is too tenuous a distinction
for us to adopt as a rule of law.
Id. (Kennard,J., dissenting) (quoting Blue Bell v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
715 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)).
163. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting); cf Sandra P. Henry & Michael R. Lane,
Legislating Accountant's Third-Party Liability?, CPA J., June 1989, at 49. Henry and
Lane contend that because long lists of potential third parties will expand audi-
tors' liability under Illinois law, auditors would prefer an extremely short list or
none at all. Id. The authors believe, however, that if the auditor is looking out
for the best interest of the client, the list of third parties "should be as long and
as broad as possible [to] allow the client latitude in the use of the report." Id.
The authors also state that auditor's should have a "good faith" duty to be in-
formed of interested third parties. Id.
164. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 784 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard,
J., dissenting); see also Boveri & Marshall, Note, supra note 5, at 287 (noting that
"a clever accountant could circumvent the Restatement provision by asking his
[or her] client not to reveal the intended users of the statements.").
165. Bily, 834 P.2d at 784 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 786 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that the majority's
holding provided unfair advantages to the "wealthy and financially savvy" inves-
tors and lenders who can afford to seek alternative measures in assessing the risk
of a financial transaction while disadvantaging those investors and lenders with
modest means whose only feasible resource is the independent audit report. Id.
(Kennard, J., dissenting); see also Wiener, supra note 5, at 253 (noting that "not
all lenders and investors are of an institutional species, capable financially and in
terms of expertise to guard against the accountant's negligence.").
168. Bily, 834 P.2d at 786 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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will include "less careful audits, inefficient allocation of capital re-
sources, increased transaction costs for loans and investments, and delay




The majority, relying on public policy considerations, concluded
that an auditor's liability falls outside of California's well-established
foreseeability standard.170 Although the court identified valid interests
in protecting accountants, it failed to adequately consider the auditor's
unique relationship with third parties and responsibilities that auditors
have to them.171 These factors are essential to determine legal duty and
should have received greater attention. Moreover, instead of arbitrarily
limiting an auditor's liability to foreseen third parties, the court should
have placed more faith on the existing judicial safeguards and deferred
to the legislature to impose a more equitable solution. 172 Finally, audi-
tors have the ability to limit their own scope of liability through various
cautionary and contractual measures.173 If the majority had considered
these factors, its decision would have struck a more equitable balance
between compensating foreseeable third parties and 'protecting in-
dependent auditors-a balance which International Mortgage achieved by
adopting the foreseeability standard.
The majority disregarded the fact that an auditor has broader re-
sponsibilities to third parties than almost any other professional infor-
mation supplier. 174 The primary purpose of an independent audit is to
provide the economic community with unbiased and credible informa-
tion for the execution of business decisions. 175 Without this function,
auditing would be insignificant both for the economic community and
169. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
170. For a discussion of California's foreseeability standard as established
by common and civil law, see supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
171. For a discussion of an auditor's responsibilities and relationship to
third parties, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
172. For a discussion of judicial safeguards and the role of legislation in
auditor liability claims, see infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of the various cautionary and contractual measures
available to independent auditors, see infra notes 199-200 and accompanying
text.
174. See Lazare, Note, supra note 16, at 902 (stating that auditors' scope of
liability is more expansive than in other professions).
175. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 749 (Cal. 1992). The ma-
jority in fact states that audits are primarily used by companies to "establish the
financial credibility of their enterprises in the perceptions of [capital suppliers]."
Id.; see also Reinier H. Kraakman, Discussion of Auditor Liability and Information Dis-
closure, 3J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 341 (1988) (noting that "[a]uditors are infor-
mational intermediaries who make representations credible by verifying their
contents."); Paschall, supra note 1, at 723 (recognizing third parties as primary
users of audits to evaluate financial position of audited company).
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for the individual accounting firms.' 76 If independent audits were not
utilized in the financial community, the "Big Six" accounting firms
would turn into the "Tiny Thousand" accounting firms.
The court's rationale also ignored the fact that some professions are
materially and inherently more riskier than others. For example, attor-
neys may be subject to third party liability. Their potential liability ex-
posure, however, is usually limited to the client or a small number of
third parties. 177 Accountants, however, who know that their work is
used by more third parties than almost any other profession, who volun-
tarily enter into the auditing profession, who receive premiums for their
services, and whose demand is driven by these third parties should not
receive protection from the courts just because their work exposes them
to a variety of potential claimants.178 For example, there are many sim-
176. Fiflis, supra note 60, at 35 (noting that "[t]he primary reason for the
existence of the accounting profession . . . is the audit function and its related
activities."); see also STETrLER, supra note 1, at 26. In discussing the importance
of an auditor's independence, Stettler theorizes that
[n]ormally, a member of a profession is expected to be concerned
solely with the interests of clients, and deference to the interests of an-
other party would be cause for breach-of-contract action by the client.
But in performing independent auditing services, the public accountant
must rise above the interests of the client and be concerned with the
interests of third parties, often unknown, who will be relying on the
financial statements in question. Only so long as the public accountant
maintains high standards of independence and impartiality will audit
reports continue to be accepted by businesses, financial institutions,
and investors. Should the practitioner lose the reputation for indepen-
dence in auditing work, an opinion would become no more acceptable
than the representations by management in statements which it has
prepared.
Id. at 26.
177. Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-
Party Liability of Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1309, 1316-17 (1991). While auditors have a duty to provide unbiased in-
formation for the economic community, attorneys only have a duty to "zealously
pursue" the interests of their clients. Id. Therefore, third parties would be less
likely to rely on the representations made by an attorney. Id.
178. See Besser, supra note 12, at 507. Besser states that "it becomes a
highly questionable practice to allow a profession to be employed and gain the
benefits of a position of trust without insisting it assume the responsibilities
which accompany that position." Id.; see also Henry & Lane, supra note 163, at
46-51. In discussing the various legislative enactments which limit an auditor's
liability, Henry and Lane explain that:
Accountants ... are in the unusual position of having potential liability
to unspecified or unknown third parties; this is primarily due to the
nature of the accountants' work product-the auditors report. There-
fore, accountants are in a unique situation which requires them to work
for a particular client and to owe a duty of due care to that client, as
well as to unspecified third parties who may use and rely on the report
in making business decisions.
Id. at 46; see also Wiener, supra note 5, at 258 (arguing that accountants "derive
substantial economic benefit" from auditing and should therefore be responsi-
ble for performing these tasks in "professionally reasonable manner").
278
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ilarities between an amateur flyer and a model car builder. Both hobby-
ists enjoy their activities, both invest time and resources in their
activities, and both voluntarily chose to participate in their respective
activities. Amateur flyers, however, know that their chances of causing
injury to themselves or others is phenomenally greater than that of a
model car builder. Insofar as amateur fliers acknowledge this greater
risk, they concede that the risk is the "price" for playing the game. Simi-
larly, auditors know the level of responsibility to the public that they
voluntarily assume, and they should not receive liability exemption from
this responsibility by the court.1
79
Moreover, holding accountants responsible to third parties who rely
on their certified financial statements will ensure higher quality and
more accurate audits. 180 For example, clients need favorable audits to
obtain capital.' 8 1 If the audit is favorable, the client may not look into
the quality of the audit. Therefore, the auditor has no incentive to pro-
vide the highest quality audit but only the most favorable one. 182 Im-
posing third party liability will ensure that an audit's quality and
accuracy will not be overlooked.1 83 Moreover, imposition of third party
liability not only insures that financial information entering the eco-
nomic system remains credible but also increases the level of trust that
investors and creditors have in audits.' 8 4 This measure of trust allows
them to invest in high risk, high growth companies.
18 5
179. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 786 (Cal. 1992) (Ken-
nard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard asserted that auditors should not be al-
lowed to "profit from the value produced by anticipated third party reliance and
yet escape all responsibility when their negligence results in injury to relying
third parties." Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
180. Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (N.J. 1983) (imposing duty of
care to foreseeable third parties induces auditors to perform more meticulous
auditing reviews); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d
361, 365 (Wis. 1983) (imposing liability to third parties deters negligent conduct
and increases due care in performance of services).
181. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 781 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 781-82 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
183. See Kraakman, supra note 175, at 341. Kraakman argues that the impo-
sition of duty to third party lenders and investors will compel auditors to war-
rant the quality of their reports. Id. This "warranty" will increase the credibility
of information and reduce the monetary risks of third parties transacting with
audited companies. Id.
184. Id. at 781 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
185. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard asserts that investors
who suffer losses after relying on unsound certified financial information will not
have the resources to support the growth of other businesses. Id. (Kennard, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, investors, damaged by their reliance on erroneous finan-
cial information, will divert investment capital for high risk, high growth busi-
nesses and invest their funds in "well-established," stable businesses. Id.
(Kennard, J., dissenting); but see Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1967. Siliciano theo-
rizes that extension of liability to third parties will have a negative impact on
"young or small or unstructured" companies. Id. Typically these companies
have low success rates. Auditors, fearing third party liability in the event of fail-
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The majority's view that third party creditors and lenders should
rely on their own resources to evaluate the financial condition of a par-
ticular business I8 6 is economically inefficient considering the existing
role of the independent auditor as a "public watchdog."'18 7 The court
failed to consider that some creditors and investors lack the resources to
conduct separate financial investigations.18 8 Economic inefficiency is
created when these creditors with limited resources perform a function
that has already been completed.' 8 9 Dollars wasted on performing re-
dundant audits could be channeled into productive expenditures.
Therefore, the law should not discourage investors and creditors from
relying on these representations.
Although the auditing field should be held responsible for its negli-
gent misrepresentations, the social utility of auditing suggests that audi-
tors cannot be exposed to a level of liability so severe that it would
destroy their industry.19 0 Prior to Bily, the existing judicial standards in
California provided the necessary safeguards against such catastrophe
without resorting to the restrictive steps taken in Bily. For example,
although the majority correctly stated that the accurateness of an audi-
tor's work is primarily controlled by the client, it failed to recognize that
an auditor's standard of care is judged in light of this condition.' 9 ' An
independent auditor's level of care is thus determined by what a reason-
ure, will be unwilling to provide services to these high risk companies. Id.
Therefore, creditors and investors involved with these particular entities will be
left with no audit protection. Id. This consequence is far worse than the "im-
perfect protection" realized under the Ultramares approach. Id.
186. Bily, 834 P.2d at 765.
187. For a discussion of the role of an independent auditor as a "public
watchdog," see notes 2-4, and accompanying text.
188. Bily, 834 P.2d at 785 (Kennard,J., dissenting) (noting that small credi-
tors and investors may not be able to afford separate audit).
189. Id. (Kennard,J., dissenting). Justice Kennard asserted that the major-
ity's decision will harm the small creditors and investors "whose only faults are
their modest means and their willingness to place their trust in independent au-
dit reports." Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
190. See Raymond v. Paradise Unified Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851-52
(Cal. Ct. App. 1963). The Raymond court stated that the determination of duty
in a negligence action takes into consideration several policy judgements, in-
cluding the valuation of social utility in the activity that causes injury. Id. The
social utility of such activity must be weighed against several factors including: 1)
the risks associated with the activity; 2) the capability of each party to shoulder
the financial burdens of the injury; and 3) the ability of each party to disseminate
the loss. Id. When the social utility of the activity is greater than the risks of the
activities, no duty should be enforced. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 291-293 (1965).
191. See AICPA AUDITING STANDARDS: ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, supra
note 20, at § 110.02. The AICPA Auditing Standards states that "[t]he financial
statements are management's responsibility. The auditor's responsibility is to
express an opinion on the financial statements. Management is responsible for
adopting sound accounting policies and for establishing and maintaining an in-
ternal control structure." Id. The AICPA further states that "[t]he responsibil-
ity of the independent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which responsibility
280
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ably prudent independent auditor would do in a similar situation, not by
what a reasonably prudent internal 'accountant would do in the same
situation.1 92 Moreover, a plaintiff must prove that he justifiably relied to
his or her detriment on an auditor's inaccurate statements. 19 3 This
standard leads to a presumption that large sophisticated investors and
lenders who have the resources to use other means to make financial
decisions would not "place all their eggs in one basket" and solely rely
on certified financial statements.
19 4
Arguably, there are negative aspects of the "foreseeability ap-
proach" that judicial safeguards cannot adequately prevent. For exam-
ple, commentators have suggested that the foreseeability approach
prevents auditor's from obtaining adequate insurance in a "foreseeable
jurisdiction"' 1 95 and increases meritless claims arising from third parties
differs as to clients and others) arises only when such failure clearly results from
failure to comply with generally accepted auditing standards." Id. § 110.05.
192. Bily, 834 P.2d at 779 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see also International
Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 225
(Cal. 1986). The International Mortgage court stated that:
The auditor is not guaranteeing the client's records and resulting finan-
cial statements are perfect; only that any errors which might exist could
not be detected by an audit conducted under GAAS and GAAP. Thus,
the auditor's degree of control over the client's records is unimportant;
the auditor need only control his or her abilities to apply GAAS and
GAAP to a given audit situation.
Id.
193. Paschall, supra note 1, at 704.
194. The majority asserted that the final decision for a creditor or lender to
issue a business capital is based on many different business factors that "have
little to do with the audit report." Bily, 834 P.2d at 779. In this respect, a de-
fendant auditor can attack a claim of reliance by providing expert testimony
showing "that a reasonable investor or lender would not have relied on the ac-
countant's opinion under the same circumstances .... " Id. (Kennard, J., dis-
senting). But see Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1947. Siliciano argues that if
accountant liability is extended, a third party who is injured when a company
goes into financial ruin will have a vested incentive to "feign or exaggerate its
reliance" on an audit in an attempt to recover from the solvent accountant. Id.
Siliciano notes that this type of fabricated reliance is difficult to test in the court
room because most evidence will come from the uncorroborated oral testimony
of the plaintiff. Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 746 (1975)).
195. Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1949. Insurance companies fix their prices
according to the level of risks encountered by the insured. Id. at 1950. If insur-
ance companies are unable to ascertain the scope of an insured's losses, uncer-
tainty will demand that insurers raise their rates significantly. Id. This situation
directly applies to independent auditors in a "foreseeable state," because they
have no way of determining approximately how much capital is "riding" on the
audit. Id.; see also Jack P. Kramer, Is There Trouble on the Horizon?, CPA J., March
1992, at 67 (stating that current recession coupled with erosion of privity stan-
dard will lead to high insurance rates); Foust, supra note 53, at 78. The Big Six's
insurance premiums have increased "tenfold" since 1985, while their maximum
coverage has been halved. Foust, supra note 53, at 78. Typical settlements, that
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looking for a quick "out of court" settlement.' 9 6 These problems, how-
ever, could be substantially reduced by legislative reform, which could
impose harsh penalties on parties advancing meritless claims. 19 7 More-
over, legislation could also mandate arbitration for accountant liability
cases to eliminate jury biases, reduce the price of litigation, and prevent
unreasonably large damage awards.' 9 8
Individual accountants can also take precautionary measures to
limit their exposure to potential liability through contractual meas-
ures. 19 9 Moreover, accountants can also limit their liability exposure by
performing a careful review and evaluation of the client and his busi-
ness, by limiting the distribution of the audit report, and by boosting in-
house quality control.
20 0
196. See Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1947. Siliciano argued that extended lia-
bility will produce a plethora of law suits which may force accountants to settle
otherwise nonmeritorious claims. Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975)). In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court explained
that a third party's complaint against an independent auditor may have "a settle-
ment value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at
trial." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1975); see
also Cook, supra note 8, at 1 (stating that "unwarranted litigation" and "coerced
settlements" are principle causes of accountant's liability problems).
197. Cook, supra note 104, at 7. One act that has been proposed to reduce
the volume of meritless claims in "lOb-5" actions (concerning securities fraud)
and negligence actions is the Securities Private Enforcement Reform Act of
1992. Id. at 6. Under this act, accountants liable for negligence would only be
accountable for their proportionate share of the third party's injuries. Id. For
example, if the auditor can prove that the client fraudulently tampered with the
financial statements, a jury would be able to measure the amount of injury
caused by the client and the injury caused by the auditor. Id. Moreover, losing
parties would be responsible for paying the winning party's court costs and legal
fees, unless the losing party can prove that the claim was substantially justified.
Id. Adoption of these policies may discourage meritless claims and give "blame-
less" accountants the incentive to go to trial rather than settling outside of court.
Id.
198. JONATHAN M. LANDERS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 340-41 (2d ed. 1988).
199. See Anthony J. Mancuso, Engagement Letters, CPA J., Dec. 1991, at 81.
Mancuso believes that accountants can limit their potential liability in auditing
functions by preparing an engagement letter. Id. An engagement letter typi-
cally outlines the scope of the audit, the responsibilities between the client and
the auditor, and the limitations of the audit. Id.
200. Rezaee, supra note 137, at 66-70. Rezaee's program is divided into
client-based and firm-based strategies. Id. Under the client-based strategy,
Razaee advocates the following preventive measures: 1) evaluate potential cli-
ents carefully by reviewing their management, general integrity, ability to pay,
prior litigation history and any possible conflicts of interest; 2) exercise "profes-
sional skepticism" during the entire audit by recognizing the incentives clients
may have to intentionally tamper with numbers in the financial statements; 3)
avoid servicing clients outside the accounting firm's "level of expertise;" 4) de-
velop a comprehensive knowledge of the client's business, including the client's
relationship with its third party lenders and creditors, the clients prior tax re-
turns and financial statements, and internal client developments (such as
changes in management, the nature of the client's business and its litigation sta-
tus); and 5) use "extreme care" in auditing high legal risk clients. Id. at 66-67.
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The foreseeability standard set forth in International Mortgage pro-
vided adequate protection for auditors while redressing the valid claims
of third party investors and creditors. The Bily court's decision, limiting
the scope of an auditor's duty of care, is unwarranted under California's
current public policy and judicial safeguards. This decision will have
serious repercussions not only to individual investors and creditors, but
also, to the general economic community.
IV. IMPACT OF BILY. TOUGH TIMES FOR SMALL CREDITORS
AND INVESTORS
The decision in Bily will inevitably protect California's accounting
industry while injuring financially limited investors and lenders who lack
the resources to obtain other qualified information. 20 1 Every auditor
attempts to juggle the conflicting interests of remaining unbiased and
obtaining clients who desire favorable audit reports. 20 2 If liability expo-
sure is restricted, the incentive for remaining unbiased decreases, and
the balance shifts in favor of pleasing the client by providing a biased
opinion. 20 3 This result would interject erroneous information into the
Under the firm-based strategy, Rezaee suggests the following measures: 1)
solve internal personnel problems by identifying drug and alcohol abuse in em-
ployees that may cause them to perform inadequately; 2) implement stringent
quality control measures focusing on "compliance with GAAS, quality control
policies and procedures, and professional ethics;" 3) provide an adequate
number of qualified employees to conduct the audit while ensuring that they are
properly trained and supervised and that they understand the necessary level of
"professional care;" 4) implement peer reviews and provide continuous in-
house educational training for personnel; 5) exercise due professional care at all
times; 6) limit third party reliance on your reports by describing the purpose of
your services, identifying the third party or class of third parties entitled to rely
on the audit, disclaiming liability to all other third parties, and limiting the use of
the audit report; 7) maintain adequate legal counsel and insurance coverage; 8)
obtain letters of representation from clients which ensure that the client knows
its responsibility for the "fair representation of financial statements" and which
provides the accounting firm with evidence of contributory negligence in any
potential law suits; 9) restructure the accounting firm to limit its exposure to
liability; 10) review a client's internal control system as a way to identify weak
or problem areas of the client; 11) adopt new standard audit report that "com-
municate[s] more clearly" to Congress, juries and the public the "nature of the
auditor's work, what an audit entails, the responsibility assumed, as well as the
auditor's conclusions about the financial statements;" and 12) exercise defen-
sive auditing by asking at all stages of the audit, "[a]m I able to defend my
work." Id. at 67-70.
201. Bily, 834 P.2d at 785 (KennardJ., dissenting).
202. Stettler, supra note 1, at 26-27. Stettler theorizes that if the auditor
acts with too much "zeal for independence" he or she may lose his or her client.
Id. On the other hand, if the auditor tries too hard to please the client, the result
may be approval of statements that are "misleading." Id.
203. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 781 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard,
J., dissenting). Kennard argues that auditors are highly motivated to keep their
clients satisfied because the client pays for the auditing services and provides
continuing business. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). This is not to say that audi-
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marketplace. The resulting effect would damage individual creditors
and investors who rely on the auditor's opinion and ultimately weaken
the economic community that needs accurate information to function
optimally. 204 This consequence would defeat the purpose of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934 which mandates independent financial
audits for most publicly held companies. 20 5 Moreover, the Bily decision
may start a trend toward severely limiting an auditor's liability exposure
in jurisdictions that have not yet addressed this issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Restricting the scope of accountants' liability under the privity ap-
proach or under the Restatement approach is a judicial solution that may
reward unreasonable and unethical conduct and may arbitrarily deny re-
covery to injured third parties with valid legal claims. In the mid-1930s,
the Security and Exchange Commission boosted the demand for in-
dependent audits by mandating unbiased financial disclosure. Our legal
system should not allow accountants to derive all the benefits of in-
dependent auditing without assuming reciprocal responsibilities. The
solution to this issue is not to deny valid claims to reasonably foresee-
able third parties. Rather, the proper solution is to retain the foresee-
ability standard, maintain tight judicial standards and pursue legislation
that reduces meritless claims and insurance costs.
Lewis P. Checchia
tors will act fraudulently, but rather, that they may not commit to the same high
standard of care. STE-rrLER, supra note 1, at 26-27. Moreover, Stettler argues
that an auditor's desire to satisfy his or her client may result in approving mis-
leading financial statements that results in loss of reputation. Id. Stettler states
that once information concerning a specific accountant's failure to remain in-
dependent goes public, the economic community will become suspicious and
lose faith in all public accountants. Id. at 26.
204. See Wiener, supra note 5, at 259. Justice Wiener, in discussing the im-
portant role of independent auditing in the financial community, argues that
auditor misrepresentations produce "skewed investment decisions." Id. These
decisions have a negative effect on the general economy and result in "signifi-
cant financial injury" to individual investors. Id. But see Robert Mednick, The
War on Accountant's Legal Liability, CPAJ., Mar. 1990, at 23 (stating that expansive
liability provides incentives for auditors to restrict "free flow" of financial infor-
mation which is critical to our economic system).
205. For a discussion of the acts passed under the Securities and Exchange
Commission, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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